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Interpreting Public Interest Provisions in International 
Investment Treaties 
Alison Giest 
Abstract 
 
Investor-state arbitral provisions are incorporated into various bilateral and multilateral 
investment agreements, providing foreign investors means to recover from host states when 
investment expectations change. There is debate on the merits and harms of these investment 
arbitral provisions, some of which surrounds the provisions’ effects on public interest regulation. 
Vague treaty language has led to inconsistent arbitral outcomes and a chilling effect on public 
interest regulation. Despite attempting to improve health or environmental conditions, states may 
be vulnerable to large amounts of liability in international arbitration. How much regulatory 
liberty do the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, North American Free Trade Agreement, 
and Trans-Pacific Partnership each provide to states? After arguing that the regulatory liberty is 
insufficient, this Comment considers various strategies for increasing state regulatory capacity, 
concluding that a good-faith inquiry tied to international norms would provide for a better balance 
between state and investor interests. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
International investment law protects foreign investments from state action 
through thousands of international bilateral and multi-state treaties.1 These treaties 
allow multinational corporations or individual investors to recover from countries 
when their investment expectations decrease due to domestic regulatory and legal 
changes, arguably enabling greater economic growth and foreign direct 
investment.2 With aspects of both public international law and private commercial 
arbitration underlying the field,3 the international investment regime struggles to 
provide a consistent body of law.4 The treatment of national regulation in 
international investment treaty language exemplifies this tension. Regulatory 
language has evolved in recent years, as drafters attempt to strike a balance 
between foreign investors’ expectations and host countries’ desire to regulate 
without exposure to liability. This Comment analyzes treaty interpretations that 
reconcile these competing interests, looking specifically at various iterations of the 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
Countries bind themselves to the possibility of investor-state settlement and 
arbitration through various multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),5 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), and bilateral trade treaties. Disputes may arise as countries regulate to 
advance “essential security and the public order, human rights, sustainable 
economic growth, environmental protection, social and labour standards, cultural 
policy and the capacity to respond to situations of economic emergencies.”6 
Where two countries are party to a treaty, an investor from Country A who invests 
in Country B can bring a claim against Country B when changes in Country B’s 
regulatory environment negatively affect the investment. Over 3,000 agreements7 
strengthen investor rights through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
provisions.8 As of 2014, there have been over 500 formal disputes between 
                                                 
1  Aikaterini Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, in 10 STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 19–21 (2014). 
2  Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 62 (2011); Chiara Coppotelli, Investor-
State Adjudication Mechanism Negotiations in the TTIP: An Unpopular Endeavor into the Potential Politicization 
of Dispute Settlement, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1355, 1357–58 (2016). 
3  Titi, supra note 1, at 29.  
4  See Schill, supra note 2, at 58. 
5  David Dayen, The Big Problem With the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Super Court That We’re Not Talking 
About, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/AZ6A-X5L7.  
6  Titi, supra note 1, at 19. 
7  Dayen, supra note 5. 
8  ISDS is the umbrella term for these disputes. 
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investors and states, with an increase in recent years as more investment treaties 
are signed.9 
Recently, international investment law has faced abundant public and 
academic criticism, much of which stems from its interference with states’ right 
to regulate.10 As tribunals provide investors greater opportunities to recover, states 
will naturally regulate less for fear of liability. Scholars have speculated that this 
phenomenon has spawned a “legitimacy crisis” where countries may exit 
investment treaties.11 Developments in recent BITs and FTAs attempt to tackle 
these growing concerns with text that recognizes states’ ability to regulate in the 
public interest domain.12 The U.S. Model BIT and Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) texts would seem to restore regulatory sovereignty to the states, 
but interpretive concerns provide insight into the continuing tension between 
investors and states in international investment law.13 
The U.S. Model BIT serves as the template for U.S. investment treaties, and 
is crucial to understanding any U.S. investment provision. There have been several 
iterations of the Model, which will be further discussed in Section IV. In 2004, 
officials made significant changes by limiting the types of claims that investors 
could bring, introducing statutes of limitations, and clarifications of the definition 
of investment.14 Despite increased criticism of the Model BIT and BITs generally, 
there were few material changes between the 2004 and 2012 versions.15 The 2012 
version served as a model for the investment provision in the TPP.16 The TPP 
was a draft multilateral trade treaty being negotiated among Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S. 
and Vietnam17 that set rules to “regulate about one-third of global trade and 
investment.”18 The TPP’s draft investment provisions were leaked last year. While 
                                                 
9  Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 
459, 463 (2015).  
10 Titi, supra note 1, at 32–33.  
11  Schill, supra note 2, at 29.  
12  Titi, supra note 1, at 24–26.  
13 See id. at 35–37 (describing the competing concerns as a line drawing problem where it is unclear 
how to distinguish “between the right to regulate and limitations on treaty’s investment 
protections”).  
14  Lise Johnson, The 2012 U.S. Model BIT and What the Changes (or Lack Thereof) Suggest About Future 
Investment Treaties, 8 POL. RISK INS. NEWSL., No. 2, Nov. 2012, https://perma.cc/X2D3-4TZ5, at 
1–2. 
15  See Mark Kantor, Little Has Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 27 ICSID REVIEW 
335, 378 (2012).  
16  Id.  
17  Titi, supra, note 1, at 61.  
18  Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2015). 
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there is an emphasis in the language on the right to regulate in the public interest 
domain,19 the TPP investment language falls victim to many of the criticisms of 
other treaties’ investment provisions. The U.S. withdrew from the treaty prior to 
ratification, limiting the scope of the liability that the TPP would have yielded.20 
However, its language would be similar to that incorporated in other investment 
and trade treaties.  
TPP negotiations over investment provisions sparked significant criticism 
and debate because of the increased amount of liability for regulating that the 
countries would face.21 Some countries ensured that they would be exempt from 
the TPP’s ISDS provision.22 And while one treaty, like the TPP, would not alter 
international investment law greatly because of the large number of treaties already 
in existence,23 the criticism of the TPP reflects the negative perception of ISDS 
generally. Without rectifying the system, ISDS will continue to face criticism. The 
evolution of the U.S. Model BIT and drafting of the TPP reflect some of the most 
current thinking regarding investments and regulation. Both will be discussed in 
Sections IV and V.  
This Comment proposes that clarity in future public interest provisions 
would provide stability for states, and produce no greater harm to investors than 
the treatment that domestic corporations receive or that multinational 
corporations face in their own states. Given recent criticism and increased 
transparency in international investment law, there is reason to think that arbitral 
tribunals would be receptive to interpretive guidance. Additionally, uniformly 
reading in a good-faith requirement with respect to state regulation, and putting 
the burden on investors to prove bad faith, would provide greater clarity for states, 
investors, and tribunals.  
Section II proceeds by briefly describing the background of international 
investment agreements, highlighting the benefits and criticisms of the system and 
establishing the need to rectify investment law procedure, as opposed to 
eliminating investor-state dispute mechanisms. Section III explains how public 
interest exceptions for state liability have been incorporated into treaty language, 
and proceeds in Sections IV and V by showing how public interest exceptions 
                                                 
19  See Titi, supra note 1, at 26. 
20  See Kevin Granville, What is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacific-
partnership.html?_r=1. 
21  See Franck, supra note 9, at 464.  
22  Andrew Stephenson & Lee Carroll, The Investment Treaty Arbitration Review, The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/K6FB-6VJV.  
23  See Todd N. Tucker, Creeping Multilateralism, TODD N. TUCKER: UNDER TWO CEILINGS (Apr. 30, 
2015), https://perma.cc/A5Q7-JXS4 (“But if the past pacts continue to exist, then investors could 
pluck the most pro-investor provisions from a country’s entire roster of treaties. Such use of [the 
most-favored nation clause] sharply diminishes the utility of treaty-by-treaty reform efforts.”).  
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have evolved in the U.S. Model BIT, NAFTA, and the TPP. After establishing 
that the most current treaties provide insufficient guidance to tribunals, Section 
VI describes several proposed solutions. Finally, the Comment concludes by 
emphasizing the importance of interpretive guidance and a good-faith 
requirement. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS  
A.  Background of International Investment Agreements  
Prior to the growth of BITs, investor disputes were resolved either by 
domestic courts or by the investor’s home country, which would negotiate the 
matter on behalf of the investor with the host state. Conversely, BITs and FTAs 
govern modern investment disputes where the investor is a party to the dispute 
against the host state.24 BITs developed after World War II by countries to protect 
the investments of their nationals in other countries. The number of BITs grew 
exponentially during the 1990s, following recommendations by the U.N. and the 
proliferation of neoliberalism as part of a global strategy to increase investment in 
developing countries.25 Arbitration offered protection for investors who were 
skeptical about the reliability of property rights in developing countries.26 
Countries signed many BITs before the growth of the robust investor-state 
industry that exists today, and may not have been aware of the liability risk they 
had opened themselves up to for some time.27 Today, international investment 
treaties and arbitration occur all over the globe, with investment flowing to 
developing and developed countries. Over 90 percent of BITs include investor-
state arbitration as the means for resolving investor-state disputes.28 The transition 
from state-state negotiation to state-investor arbitration shifted power away from 
states and toward investors and arbitrators.29 
The components of each BIT are key to understanding the scope of potential 
liability. Each BIT includes definitions, delineation of substantive rights, and a 
preamble that may guide interpretation of the substantive rights.30 Substantive 
rights include: (1) fair and equitable treatment that “sets a minimum standard of 
                                                 
24  Schill, supra note 2, at 73–74.  
25  See Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 315 
(2014). 
26  Schill, supra note 2, at 63. 
27  Katselas, supra note 2525, at 326–29. 
28  Id. at 324. 
29  See Schill supra note 2, at 74.  
30  Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1364. 
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treatment of all foreign investors,”31 including things like legitimate expectations 
and due process;32 (2) “most favored nation” clauses that prevent a host country 
from favoring one country over another;33 (3) a national treatment standard 
providing that foreign investments cannot be treated worse than domestic ones;34 
(4) umbrella clauses providing investors a cause of action in contractual claims 
against governments, in addition to instances where an investor is able to make a 
claim against the state because of its regulation;35 and (5) “full protection and 
security,” which protects investors from expropriation.36 An investor can claim 
violations of multiple substantive rights, depending on the particular facts of the 
case, in hopes of recovering under at least one. Additionally, there are a number 
of arbitral bodies with various rules, and each treaty designates which body 
considers its claims.37 Some treaties may be more favorable to a specific claim than 
others.38 Since countries are oftentimes parties to multiple treaties, an investor can 
choose under which treaty they want to bring a claim.39 
                                                 
31  Meredith Wilensky, Reconciling International Investment Law and Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability 
for Climate Measures Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10683, 10685 (2015). 
32  Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1369–70. 
33  See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10685. Even if a country adopts a more “state-friendly” international 
investment provision, an investor can insist on more investor-friendly treatment if the state gives 
such treatment to another country’s investors in other treaties. Todd Tucker, The TPP Has a Provision 
Many Will Love to Hate: ISDS. What is it, and Why Does it Matter?, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015) 
https://perma.cc/5UQG-YHWS. Often the most-favored nation provision implies an “in like 
circumstances” test where the tribunal is to decide if the measure is legitimate based on how a 
different investor would be treated under the same circumstances. See Titi, supra note 1, at 143. 
34  See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10685. 
35  Titi, supra note 1, at 48.  
36  Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1364, 1375 (Explaining that a breach of contract may only be 
expropriation if the state was acting in a sovereign, not a commercial, capacity.). 
37  Arbitration bodies include: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the 
World Bank (ICSID), the London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber 
of Commerce, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and ad hoc panels set up under 
the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. Claire Provost 
& Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets Corporations Sue Countries, THE GUARDIAN (June 
10, 2015), https://perma.cc/DUC6-KCWT. 
38  Odysseas Repousis, Multiple Investment Treaties Between the Same States?: The Case of the ECT, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/RKU7-DUWQ. For example, an energy 
investor might have the option of bringing a claim under a relevant BIT or the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), both of which have investor-state arbitration clauses. Unless the drafters have 
accounted for which treaty takes precedence, an investor can choose to bring a claim under either 
treaty, likely one of the BITs in this instance that is more favorable to its claim. 
39  Concerns over treaty-shopping are exacerbated by the low bar to being considered an investor in a 
particular country. Qualifying as an investor in a country may require “registration” in a country or, 
in some cases, “substantial business presence” in one’s designated home country. WILLIAM STRENG 
& JESWALD SALACUSE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PLANNING: LAW AND TAXATION VOL. 2 § 10.06 
(2015). Where an investor from Country A wants to invest in Country B, but no treaty exists to 
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Despite having generated over 500 disputes, decisions of arbitral tribunals 
are non-binding on future cases. This leads to legal ambiguity. Further, there are 
inconsistencies between case outcomes even within the same fora.40 That being 
said, panels often reference earlier arbitral decisions, creating something of 
persuasive precedent. Panels often publish awards, but publish the full opinions 
less often.41 Empirical evidence suggests that arbitral bodies rely more on their 
prior decisions than on the language of the particular treaty at hand, further 
obfuscating the legal standards.42 This could suggest that the language of the treaty 
may not be particularly meaningful––whether or not there is explicit denunciation 
of public interest regulation. But it could also suggest that, even if some treaties 
have not incorporated public interest exceptions, arbitral tribunals may be able to 
consider public interest ramifications where relevant.   
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the 
World Bank (ICSID) is one of the most common arbitral fora included in BIT 
treaties, arbitrating claims over matters such as pollution regulation, expropriation 
of property and oil reserves, and minimum wage increases.43 ICSID is also a 
convention that 150 states have signed.44 With so many countries, it is a credible 
institution and source of authority in international law.45 However, there is no 
centralized body that governs investment disputes, ICSID or otherwise, aside 
from limited appellate review.46 Thus, arbitrators have leeway to consider (or 
ignore) public interest goals, free from formal oversight. 
                                                 
protect its investment, the investor might structure its investment through Country C where 
Countries B and C have a favorable BIT. Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate 
Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
225, 247 (2015). 
40  See CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: 
BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY 3 (2015).  
41 Schill supra note 2, at 80. 
42 See Schill supra note 2, at 82. 
43  See Gary Hufbauer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 109, 115 (2016).  
44  Katselas, supra note 25, at 331. 
45  See id. at 330–31. 
46  Id. at 322 (noting that, in fact, an attempt to do so in the 1990’s called the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) failed.); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: AN ASSESSMENT, 209 (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 
2015) (explaining that the ICSID Convention limits appellate review to egregious departures from 
procedure and corruption.). 
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B.  Benefits of Internat ional Investment Agreements  
International arbitral tribunals provide neutrality and efficiency that 
supporters of the current system claim states would be incapable of providing on 
their own.47 Without tribunals, there is concern that investors would be stuck 
vindicating their claims in biased local courts that do not resolve claims with 
sufficient speed. While treaties vary slightly, the tribunals largely offer a uniform 
system of rules for investors to navigate, no matter which country they invest in.48 
With this stability, investors secure investments in the event of material changes 
like the nationalization of resources.49 Developing countries may be able to attract 
more investment when foreign investors are ensured that they will not be treated 
less favorably than local companies.50 In some instances, developing countries 
might not otherwise be able to attract necessary financing.51 Some empirical 
research suggests that BITs, and specifically those that do not require domestic 
resolution first,52 attract more investment.53 Prior to international investment 
agreements, investors were left with limited recourse for harm to their 
investments. As an alternative, investments were priced differently, investors 
requested support from their home state, or they simply accepted the loss.54 
C. Criticism of International Investment Agreements  
Tension within the current international investment law system is apparent 
as countries denounce the ICSID convention, exit BITs, amend BITs, and issue 
interpretive statements.55 There has been widespread criticism from a variety of 
perspectives––criticism of the tribunals’ interpretations, the lack of 
transparency/accountability, pro-investor bias, and lost state sovereignty––
                                                 
47  Id. at 324. 
48 Schill, supra note 2, at 63. 
49  Provost & Kennard, supra note 37. 
50  Hufbauer, supra note 43, at 109. 
51 Jane E. Cross, Foreign Investment Laws in Developing Countries: Effective Industrial Policy?, 6 MICH. Y.B. 
INT’L LEGAL STUD. 155, 171 (1984). 
52 Some treaties require the dispute be litigated in domestic courts prior to moving to international 
arbitrators. This approach would be less favored by investors, as it would be more time consuming 
and costly, with a lower likelihood of recovery early on. Thus, there is a trend that removes this 
requirement in ISDS provisions. 
53  The Hon. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State 
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 
708 (2013). 
54  See Franck & Wylie, supra note 9, at 471. 
55  See Katselas, supra note 25, at 318. 
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leading to what some scholars have called the “public law challenge.”56 Recently, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela denounced ICSID completely; Ecuador has 
terminated some of its BITs; last year, India either renegotiated their BITs or 
insisted on joint interpretative statements in an attempt to rein in the interpretive 
power of tribunals.57 In countries that have rejected the ICSID convention, there 
seems to have been a decrease in foreign investment,58 but this could also be due 
to a host of other factors (including the fact that there has been a change to the 
system, leaving a wake of legal uncertainty). This Comment assumes that the 
benefits of international investment treaties outweigh the costs of total rejection 
of the system, and thus focuses on potential reforms. 
Many states have expressed dissatisfaction with the wide “interpretative 
powers” of investment tribunals that stem from the ambiguous protections 
provided for in the treaties.59 The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s 
(UNCTAD) World Investment Report criticized inconsistent readings of key 
provisions in international investment agreements and poor treaty interpretation.60 
In addition to the fact that there is no binding precedent to provide clarity in 
international investment law, the tribunals “continue to generate inconsistent 
interpretations of the same standards of investment protection and differing 
conclusions as to state liability in relation to cases with identical or similar fact 
situations.”61 Incoherent decisions make it difficult for both states and investors 
to conform their behavior to international law.62 This has been thought to also 
reduce the amount of public welfare regulation overall.63 Interpretive concerns 
will be elaborated in Section III.   
The system lacks transparency leading to both a lack of precedent for parties 
to follow and a lack of accountability.64 Nongovernmental organizations have 
focused much of their criticism here.65 Proceedings are largely confidential, 
                                                 
56  Stephan W. Schill, The Public Law Challenge: Killing or Rethinking International Investment Law?, COLUM. 
FDI PERSP. No. 58, Jan. 30, 2012. 
57  Titi, supra note 1, at 23; Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls its Investment Treaty Regime, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016), LEXIS ACADEMIC; See Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 
Ecuador: 2016 Investment Climate Statements, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 5, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/QCY6-RNVB. 
58  Brower & Blanchard, supra note 53, at 764–65. 
59  Schill supra note 2, at 66. 
60  U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report: Reforming 
International Investment Governance 145, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (June 24, 2015). 
61  HENCKELS, supra note 40, at 3. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Provost & Kennard, supra note 37. 
65  See Schill, supra note 2, at 66. 
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making it difficult to establish a line of precedent to guide behavior.66 And unlike 
most national courts, there is no legislative balance of power.67 
There is criticism of inherent pro-investor bias68 stemming from the 
historical lack of regard for public welfare in the language of investment treaties.69 
The appearance (and quite possibly the reality) of this bias, compounded by the 
structural/procedural issues like uncapped awards and the finality of arbitration 
decisions with only a limited system for appeal or review, increases the pro-
investor bias sentiment.70 Nonparties cannot participate in these confidential 
proceedings, even if they are to be affected by the outcome of the tribunal 
decision.71 
Given the uncertainty and potential bias, states regulate less—diminishing 
their sovereignty. When a country is forced to make policy changes in the interest 
of its citizens, they may be vulnerable to claims if foreign investments are affected, 
even if local investments would not be protected. The standards for bringing a 
successful investor-state dispute claim are lower than they are in most domestic 
contexts.72 
D.  The “Public Law Challenge”  
Because of the historical lack of regard for nonparties and the public in 
arbitral decisions, the criticism of investor-state dispute settlement has been 
termed the “public law challenge.”73 International investment arbitration is neither 
wholly private arbitration nor public law, but some combination of both.74 In 
commercial, contract-based arbitration the parties are viewed by arbiters as equals; 
if one party breaches the contract, that party is liable.75 This intuition is often 
mapped onto international investment arbitration between states and parties, even 
though the consent to arbitrate based on treaty rules is more attenuated than it 
would be in a commercial dispute because “the investor acts upon an opportunity 
                                                 
66  Schill, supra note 2, at 67.  
67  Katselas, supra note 25, at 331.  
68  Brower & Blanchard, supra note 53, at 711. 
69  Schill, supra note 2, at 67.  
70  Provost & Kennard, supra note 37. 
71  Schill, supra note 2, at, 64.  
72  See Katselas, supra note 25, at 331. 
73  Schill, supra note 2, at 67. 
74  Schill, supra note 2, at 59. 
75 See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 124 (2007).  
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provided by an earlier inter-state bargain.”76 This has been called “arbitration 
without privity.”77 
A public law perspective requires horizontal equality between the two states, 
not the investor and a state.78 The state should be able to exercise authority over 
its own affairs,79 in pursuit of “democracy, equal treatment, separation of powers, 
legal certainty and predictability, or in other words, the rule of law.”80 The issues 
that these investor disputes involve (that is, regulation) are areas typically handled 
by public law (i.e., the government).81 And certainly, the decisions that arbitrators 
come to, despite criticism that they can be incoherent, are an exercise of public 
authority, as they shape behavior in ways atypical of traditional commercial 
arbitration.82 Professor Stephan Schill argues that instead of blending the features 
of private and public law in a way that is inherently conflicting, we should adopt 
an international public law framework that protects other constituencies, in 
addition to the state itself and foreign investors.83 Schill suggests strengthening the 
international arbitration system by incorporating best practices from domestic 
contexts as a way to increase the legitimacy of investor-state dispute resolution. 
Domestic courts are already suited to deal with questions such as due process and 
expropriation.84 Schill’s solution will be discussed later in this Comment, but for 
now, it serves as a helpful framework for understanding the complexity of 
international investment law. 
E. Exiting International Investment Treaties  
The investor-state dispute resolution system requires procedural and 
substantive changes to address the growing criticism. For example, procedurally, 
there have been attempts to increase transparency. ICSID now publishes at least 
some excerpts of legal reasoning in its decisions, increasing accountability and 
transparency.85 UNCITRAL’s recent Transparency Rules require all decisions to 
be published.86 These are merely several examples of changes that address 
                                                 
76  Id. at 126.  
77  Schill, supra note 2, at 77. 
78  VAN HARTEN, supra note 75, at 131. 
79  See id. 
80  Schill, supra note 2, at 67. 
81  Id. at 76. 
82  See id. at 79.  
83  Id. at 59. 
84  See id. at 60.  
85  Brower, supra note 53, at 717. 
86  Id. 
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procedural flaws. Further improvements would likely increase the legitimacy of 
the tribunals themselves, but are beyond the scope of this Comment.87  
Before discussing these changes, it is important to note that it is difficult to 
exit investment treaties. When it is possible, countries lose the benefits of 
participation in the investor-state resolution system. It takes six months to exit the 
ICSID Convention, but a state still remains a party to each BIT that it has signed.88 
There is typically a waiting period in each BIT whereby a country must wait a 
specified number of years before exiting the treaty.89 And even where this does 
occur, most BITs include “survival clauses” where matters can continue to be 
arbitrated for ten to twenty years if they occurred while the treaty was effective.90 
Thus, a country must exit all BIT agreements and wait until the end of all “survival 
clauses” to no longer be vulnerable to claims. Further, given the benefits, this 
Comment assumes that countries should stay in their agreements and improve 
them, as opposed to exiting the investor-state dispute resolution system 
altogether. 
III.  PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTIONS  
A.  How Public Interest Exceptions Are Incorporated Into 
Treaties and Their Interpretation  
It is generally acknowledged that states need to be given some freedom for 
public interest regulation. In fact, the first BIT between Germany and Pakistan in 
1959 included security, public health, and morality exceptions to the most-
favored-nation substantive right.91 This Section will demonstrate the difficulty of 
defining what regulation in the public interest means, and elaborate on how the 
exception is captured in treaty language. Before expanding on this, it is important 
to consider why states should be exempt from compensating investors in certain 
instances.  
Many scholars would suggest that ordinary regulatory activity should exempt 
countries from liability under the substantive standards.92 And thus, public interest 
                                                 
87  The UNCTAD World Investment Report suggested “improving the impartiality and quality of 
arbitrators” and recommended “assisting developing countries in handling [investment dispute] 
cases.” supra note 60. 
88 Katselas, supra note 25, at 338. 
89 Id. 
90  Id. at 339. 
91  Titi, supra note 1, at 53.  
92  Id. at 33–34. Alternatively, some argue that while there is a right to regulate, it does not forgive a 
country of its obligation to compensate. But because a compensation requirement would deter 
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exceptions are incorporated into treaties to reduce taxpayer liability when the 
regulation is intended to benefit the public and prevent the chilling of such 
regulation.93 For example, taxation on tobacco might decrease an investor’s 
expectation by reducing demand for the product. But where the tax is necessary 
for health purposes, should taxpayers be expected to compensate the investor? 
This Comment and many scholars assume the answer is no. There is a justification 
for such an assumption in takings law. Without extensive review of U.S. takings 
law, the government is not expected to compensate an individual when the 
regulation is designed to prevent a public nuisance.94 Compensation is due 
generally only when the entire value of property has been reduced from the 
regulation, which is a high bar for a plaintiff to meet.95 Further, domestic investors 
are protected less than foreign investors covered by investor-state arbitration 
treaties because there is not domestic recovery for public interest or non-public 
interest regulation.96 Scholars have considered linkages between U.S. takings law 
and international investment standards, and while this analysis is outside our 
scope, takings law and its limits on compensation embody the need for 
unconstrained public interest regulation.97 
At a basic level, public interest regulation is “regulation with a basis other 
than a state of necessity, national security or the public order.”98 This Comment 
considers how to define or interpret the public interest or ordinary regulatory 
                                                 
regulation, this Comment assumes that without forgiveness of liability, the right to regulate could 
not exist. 
93  Aaron Cosbey, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: A Discussion Paper for the CEC’s Public 
Workshop on NAFTA’s Chapter 11, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
(Mar. 24, 2003), https://perma.cc/KE5W-G6RT.  
94  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (holding that a regulatory 
taking has not occurred when a regulation does “no more than duplicate the result that could have 
been achieved in the courts.”). 
95  See id. at 1030 (“When, however, a regulation that declares “off-limits” all economically productive 
or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate, 
compensation must be paid to sustain it.”); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., 543 U.S. 528, 528–530 
(2005) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (rejecting a 
regulatory takings test that assessed the extent to which a regulation advanced legitimate state 
interest, in favor of the Penn Central test that inquiries into the “economic impact on the claimant,” 
“distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the government action”). 
96  See Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the 
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 (2003).  
97  See id. There might be an argument that international investors need special protection given that 
they are not a part of the domestic political process, as a domestic tobacco producer would be. 
However, an international firm can garner domestic political support in the same way that a 
domestic firm can, and in neither case does the corporation itself have the ability to vote—it must 
influence the political process through alternate means.  
98  Titi, supra note 1, at 101.  
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activity. Metalclad99 provides an example of the difficulties that this presents. The 
tribunal in that case interpreted NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment provision 
and determined that the public interest was not sufficient to overcome indirect 
expropriation by Mexico.100 Initially, Mexico granted the Mexican company 
Coterin permission to build a hazardous waste facility. The company was sold to 
Metalclad, a Delaware company. The local government, with the appropriate 
national authority to deny such construction, later prohibited Metalclad from 
constructing the facility after protests. The local government designated the site 
as a “Natural Area for the protection of cactus.”101 The tribunal found against 
Mexico, ruling that it had denied Metalclad a “predictable framework” for 
planning its investment, thereby violating Article 1105(1) because Metalclad had 
relied on the representations made to Coterin by the Mexican government.102 
Metalclad successfully argued that Mexico failed to provide requisite clarity about 
the licensing process based on provisions in NAFTA that call for transparency.103 
They found that because Metalclad had invested a significant amount into 
construction, denying the permit constituted an indirect expropriation.104 This 
appears to be an overly broad characterization of investment expectation because 
it required a level of transparency between local and national government above 
that which is typically required in international law.105 Later interpretations have 
been limited as such.106 And in this case, Mexico petitioned for review by the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, a limited body of arbitral review. The court 
rejected the tribunal’s ruling in part—deciding that the level of transparency must 
be understood in light of international law’s deference to a country’s right to 
regulate, but upholding the indirect expropriation because it was not “patently 
unreasonable,” and Mexico had previously been satisfied with the level of 
environmental protection when they provided an initial permit.107 This case 
illuminates the conflict over public interest regulation. On a textual level, it is 
possible to frame the municipal permit denial as either reasonable or unreasonable 
public interest regulation. The arbitral proceedings highlight several problems. 
                                                 
99  See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 ILM 36 (2001).  
100  Gustavo Vega & Gilbert R. Winham, The Role of NAFTA Dispute Settlement in the Management of 
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 28 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 651, 690 (2002). 
101  Metalclad, supra note 99, at 44. See also Vega, supra note 100, at 690.   
102  Metalclad, supra note 99, at 50.  
103  Vega, supra note 100, at 690. 
104  Metalclad, supra note 99, at 50.  
105 See Titi, supra note 1, at 238: see also Vega, supra note 100, at 701–704. 
106  See Cross, supra note 51, at 162–65 (reconsidering NAFTA and the U.S. Model BIT). 
107 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), at ¶¶ 68, 
70, 72, 76, 99, 100, 134. 
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The deferential review of arbitral decisions is concerning, as is the lack flexibility 
for states to adjust their laws to changing circumstances. 
There is a generally accepted exception in international law for “bona fide” 
regulation that causes economic harm.108 However, the frequency with which 
tribunals make such inquiries is not totally clear; nor is it clear if the inquiry is 
made by tribunals in a consistent way.109 One might term these “bona fide” public 
interest regulations as those with a legitimate purpose. Despite increased 
recognition that host states should have some right to regulate,110 most BITs are 
vague with regard to what is legitimate, leaving little guidance for tribunals as to 
how to weigh competing state and investor interests and to what extent the state’s 
interest should be scrutinized. For example, the E.U.’s characterization of 
legitimate regulation as “public health, safety, environment, public morals, and the 
promotion and protection of cultural diversity”111 is quite vague. Various treaties 
create their own lists of values that are within the public interest.112 But how much 
can a regulation protect the environment? What makes protecting cacti a valid 
justification for denying a hazardous waste facility? How many cacti make it a 
worthy interest?  A list of values is of limited use without guidance on how to 
define the terms.  
When public interest exceptions are rejected by tribunals, governments may 
be left paying large amounts of money in awards or settlements, and/or the public 
left without beneficial policies.113 For example, in Vattenfall v. Germany,114 
Vattenfall, a Swedish corporation, claimed that the new water quality standards 
made their coal-fired power plant “uneconomical.”115 The claim was for over one 
billion dollars, but it settled “when the government agreed to watered-down 
standards.”116 Prospectively, governments may avoid regulating with the prospect 
of arbitration. For example, scholars suggest that Canada did not adopt tobacco 
plain packaging laws to avoid arbitration.117 Having established a need to regulate, 
                                                 
108  HENCKELS, supra note 40, at 7. 
109  See id. 
110  Titi, supra note 1, at 58.  
111  Hufbauer, supra note 43, at 118. 
112 See Titi, supra note 1, at 101.  
113  Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10684 (“In practice, these payments may make regulatory measures cost-
prohibitive, especially in an era marked by austerity.”). 
114  See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Request for 
Arbitration (2009). 
115  Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10684 (citing Vattenfall, supra note 114, at 12). 
116 Id. at 10685. 
117  See id. 
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the next three subsections explore how public interest exceptions are incorporated 
into treaties. 
1. Public interest exceptions can take the form of obligations. 
Positive regulatory language can be either obligatory or declaratory in nature. 
Neither create a “legally enforceable right” to regulate per se, but signals to 
tribunals the intentions of the party states.118 The Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union (BLEU)-Mauritius BIT (2005), for example, provides for 
explicit environmental obligations: “each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure 
that its legislation provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall 
strive to continue to improve this legislation.”119 This type of language does not, 
however, force a tribunal to weigh the public interest against that of the investor, 
whose rights are still the main focus of the treaty. Likewise, some BITs have 
expressed positive obligations for companies to abide by, like corporate social 
responsibility norms that require corporations to behave in ways that account for 
the public and/or the environment. But there is no direct cause of action against 
either the investor or the state for not complying, and the obligations of the state 
to work toward better public interest protections can only indirectly be considered 
in a tribunal when looking at an investor-state dispute. Arguably, these norms 
would be better exemplified in legislation (as opposed to investment treaties).120 
2. Public interest exceptions can be declaratory in nature. 
The second type of positive language, declaratory rights to regulate, may 
provide some signaling to tribunals, but is also substantively toothless. Norway’s 
Draft Model BIT for example states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure 
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or 
environmental concerns.”121 While signaling some receptiveness to public interest 
concerns, effectively, if a regulation is inconsistent with the treaty goals (for 
example, investment protection), then it is not within the state’s authority to 
regulate at the expense of investment.122 A drafting approach with more teeth can 
be found in Article VIII of the UK-Colombian BIT: “Nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any 
                                                 
118  Titi, supra note 1, at 10–15.   
119  Id. at 106; Bilateral Investment Treaty, BLEU-Mauritius, art. 5(1), Nov. 30, 2005, 
https://perma.cc/5GWF-T3D9. 
120  See Titi, supra note 1, at 109–10. 
121  Draft Model BIT, Norway, art. 12, 2007, https://perma.cc/U9D4-PBVD (emphasis added).  
122 See Titi, supra note 1, at 112–13.  
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measure that it considers appropriate . . . provided such that measures are non-
discriminatory and proportionate to the objectives sought.”123 Here, the 
consideration for the public interest is unqualified, as it does not include 
“otherwise consistent with this Agreement” language. But treaties with such 
language are certainly in the minority.124 
3. Public interest exceptions can be incorporated into the preamble of 
a treaty. 
While the language does not directly provide a right, incorporating the 
language in a preamble serves an interpretative purpose stemming from the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).125 Some models state that 
“investment protection is to be realised without compromising public policy 
objectives.”126 Where there is language on regulation in the preamble, the tribunals 
may be more likely to weigh the public interest more carefully. Despite the VCLT, 
tribunals have often given more interpretive power to preambles than other 
regulatory provisions in investment treaties.127 
IV.  EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.  MODEL BILATERAL TREATY  
This Section and the next demonstrate the evolution of public interest 
language in the U.S. Model Bilateral Trade Agreement (U.S. Model BIT) and the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Both treaties incorporate public interest concerns using 
all three methods described above. The chosen language theoretically guides states 
as they regulate, companies as they invest, and tribunals as they assess whether a 
given regulation is in conformity with the treaty. 
Change in the U.S. Model BIT reflects increased concern for regulation.128 
The U.S. Model BIT is a template for investment treaties between the U.S. and 
other countries. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has the freedom to 
adjust the model, but any negotiated BIT needs two-thirds Senate approval.129 The 
1984 Model BIT and treaties based on it were more investor-friendly because of 
inclusion of things like the umbrella clause that give investors the opportunity to 
                                                 
123  Id. at 114.  
124  See id. (“A more daring exception . . .”) 
125  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention].  
126  See Titi, supra note 1, at 116. 
127  See id. at 122. 
128  See id. at 69. Investors brought claims against the U.S. several times in the 1990s, sparking interest 
in treaty language adjustments.  
129  Fact Sheet: Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Apr. 
2012), https://perma.cc/56WY-WMFK.  
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recover for contract disputes with states, in addition to instances where they can 
recover for regulatory change.130 The preamble of the 1984 version included no 
public interest recognition, nor did any specific provisions provide for protection 
of the environment, labor, or any other public interest.131  
The 2004 iteration provided preamble language recognizing for the first time 
that investment goals should be met “in a manner consistent with the protection 
of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally 
recognized labor rights.”132 Interestingly, labor rights are tied to international 
standards, but other interests are not tied to any particular international or 
domestic standard.133 Without tying the right to a particular protocol or standard, 
the tribunal may be left in the dark with regard to how far a country can go in its 
public interest regulation. The 2004 model also included the Investment and 
Environment Article for the first time, recognizing that states should not lower 
their domestic environmental standards as a means to acquire investment.134 This 
prevents a state from weakening its environmental regulation, but does not 
explicitly provide that the state should have an ability to heighten regulation. A 
country that initially has low environmental standards may be vulnerable to claims 
as it attempts to regulate in line with international environmental standards. 
Reference to such standards would provide more freedom to regulate.135 Like the 
Norway Draft mentioned in Section III, the new Article included a right to 
regulate on behalf of the environment “otherwise consistent with this 
agreement,”136 reducing virtually any right to regulate if it would negatively impact 
a foreign investment. While this is recognized as a step forward, in that it 
theoretically provides protection for environmental regulation, the language 
remains vague and ineffective.137 Article 13 introduces a higher protection for 
labor, but it is still vague.138 Countries cannot reduce their labor standards “in a 
manner that weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor 
                                                 
130  Titi, supra note 1, at 49.  
131  See Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of 
February 24, 1984, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 136, 136 (1986).  
132  Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [country] Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2004), 
https://perma.cc/W3K4-WDCB [hereinafter Model BIT (2004)] (emphasis added). 
133  See id. 
134  See id. at art. 12; ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 70 (2012). 
135  See KULICK, supra note 134 at 71. 
136  2004 Model BIT, supra note 132, at art. 12. 
137  See KULICK, supra note 134, at 71. 
138  See id. 
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rights.”139 Like the environmental provision, there is no explicit freedom to 
heighten labor regulation in order to come into compliance with referenced 
international norms. However, the second clause on “otherwise consistent” 
regulation that exists in Article 12 on the environment is absent from Article 13 
on labor. The clause circumscribes freedom to regulate environmental harms 
where it is contrary to economic objectives, but labor regulation is not limited in 
the same way. There was also language added in Annex B that did not appear in 
the 1984 Model that attempts to clarify how public interest regulation relates to 
expropriations: “Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriation.”140 Theoretically, this removes the possibility that a 
legitimate welfare-enhancing regulation will be classified as an expropriation.141 
However, it is unclear what the “rare circumstances” are that would constrict a 
state’s freedom to regulate. 
The 2012 Model contains a greater amount of positive language regarding a 
right to regulate. However, it has been criticized as equally ambiguous as the 2004 
Model.142 The preambular language from the 2004 Model remains, providing some 
level of limited interpretive guidance. The language in Article 12 on the 
environment is largely the same, but the 2012 Model adds positive language 
recognizing the right143 that each state has to enact legislation “where a course of 
action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a 
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.”144 While a more formal 
right to regulate appears, it is qualified by ambiguous language like “reasonable 
exercise.” And even with this apparent right, it is unclear if a right to regulate 
forgives all ISDS liability or only mitigates it. There was also increased specificity 
as to what “environment” means in the context of the treaty.145 However, the 
                                                 
139  2004 Model BIT, supra note 132, at art. 13. 
140  Id. at Annex B (emphasis added).  
141  See Titi, supra note 1, at 38. 
142  See id. at 300; 2004 Model BIT, supra note 132. 
143  See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [country] Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2012), 
https://perma.cc/9LWZ-LTBR [hereinafter Model BIT (2012)] (“the right to exercise discretion 
with regard to regulatory, compliance, and investigatory matters”).  
144  Titi, supra note 1, at 107; 2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 12(3) (emphasis added). 
145  2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 12(4). The 2012 Model BIT provided: 
the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the 
prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health, through the: 
(a) prevention, abatement, or control of the release, discharge, or emission 
of pollutants or environmental contaminants;  
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“otherwise consistent with this Treaty” language still qualifies the right to 
regulate.146 Finally, there were some procedural additions providing for public 
participation and consultations to resolve disputes in this Article.147 Article 7 
requires “as appropriate . . . public participation.” It is ambiguous in not defining 
“appropriate,” and in not clarifying how failing to follow the procedural 
requirements would bear on liability and recovery. Presumably, the language is 
included to give the public an opportunity to voice concerns about the regulation 
or the investment, but this is not explicit. Regarding Annex B on expropriation, 
the language is identical to that which was included in the 2004 Model meaning 
that “non-discriminatory” public welfare regulation does not constitute 
expropriation except in “rare circumstances.”148 Article 13 on labor remained 
largely the same, but provides for the same procedural protections as Article 12.  
There are additional provisions in the 2012 model that tilt the balance away 
from a strong pro-investor bias. The new Model limits the scope of “investor.” 
For example, Article 17 removes treaty protection for investments owned or 
controlled by an investor from a country that is not a party to the treaty.149 
Formerly, an investor aiming to recover could set up a subsidiary in a state party 
to a favorable BIT.150 The 2012 Model removes the umbrella clause that extends 
protection to investors in contract disputes.151 Some of the substantive rights have 
been limited, which should theoretically make it more difficult to bring a claim 
against a state that has made a legitimate regulation in the public interest. The fair 
and equitable treatment provision and the full protection and security provision 
                                                 
(b) control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, 
materials, and wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto; or 
(c) protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna, including endangered 
species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas. Id. 
146  Id. at art. 12(5) (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental concerns.”). 
147  Id. at art. 12(6)–(7) (“6. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party 
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond to a request for 
consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request. Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and 
endeavor to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution. [ ] 7. The Parties confirm that each Party may, 
as appropriate, provide opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under 
this Article.”). 
148  Id. at Annex B. 
149  See id. at art. 17(1)–(2) (“A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other 
Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise 
has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a non-Party, 
or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.”). 
150  Titi, supra note 1, at 49. 
151  Id. 
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have been linked to the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens, meaning that a country does not owe an investor treatment 
beyond that which is guaranteed by international law.152 
V.  FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
TO THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP  
This Section will start by comparing NAFTA and the TPP, two free trade 
agreements that bring in more parties than a bilateral trade agreement and thus 
increase potential arbitration. While the U.S. pulled out of the TPP after the 2016 
General Election, the language in the TPP reflects current thinking about the 
investment treaties and mirrors that of the U.S. Model BIT. Public interest 
regulatory language was strengthened in the TPP draft compared to that in 
NAFTA.  
NAFTA, enacted in 1994, includes only three countries (the U.S., Mexico, 
and Canada), whereas the TPP would have included Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S. and 
Vietnam.153 NAFTA led to a nearly 500 percent increase in foreign investment 
among the member states.154  
NAFTA includes reference to the public interest in its preamble, similar to 
that of the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs, but it is even more specific.155 
Theoretically, a tribunal might attribute greater weight to the public interest when 
considering an investor’s claim because of the more specific language, a stronger 
signal of intent. The TPP considers the promotion of labor, public welfare, and 
the environment.156 And, interestingly, the treaty language provides for an explicit 
“right to regulate” for environmental protection, public welfare, public morals, 
                                                 
152  See 2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 5. 
153  Titi, supra note 1, at 61. 
154  William L. Owen, Investment Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Threat to Sovereignty of Member 
States?, 39 CAN.-U. S. L. J. 55, 56 (2014). 
155  See North American Free Trade Agreement Preamble, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 298 (1993), Pub. L. 
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (“CREATE new employment 
opportunities and improve working conditions and living standards in their respective territories; 
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation; PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; PROMOTE sustainable 
development; STREGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental law and 
regulations; and PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”). 
156  See Trans-Pacific Partnership Preamble, Feb. 4, 2016, https://perma.cc/YQK8-BA6S [hereinafter 
TPP] (“PROMOTE high levels of environmental protection, including through effective 
enforcement of environmental laws, and further the aims of sustainable development, including 
through mutually supportive trade and environmental policies and practices; PROTECT and 
enforce labour rights, improve working conditions and living standards, strengthen cooperation 
and the Parties’ capacity on labour issues.”).  
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and the adoption of healthcare systems.157 Neither the U.S. Model BITs nor 
NAFTA included such specificity in their preambles. But despite robust language 
in the preamble, it is difficult to imagine the tribunals would consider the 
preambulatory language sufficient in and of itself to increase regard for the public 
interest in arbitration, given their lack of general regard for treaty language. 
While the language in NAFTA might lead one to think that there are multiple 
carve-out provisions for the public interest, tribunals often interpret provisions in 
such a way as to limit their application.158 NAFTA included vague language, similar 
to that of the U.S. Model BITs, related to environmental protection, stating that 
in order to benefit from these provisions’ protection, the measures must be 
“otherwise consistent with this Chapter [11].”159 As a result, “Articles 1101 and 
1114 have not effectively shielded many public interest measures, nor deterred 
investors from bringing claims.”160 Commercial rights take precedence in the 
wording of the carve-out.161 The TPP employs similarly preclusive language with 
regard to the environment, public health, and regulation.162  
                                                 
157  See id. at Preamble (“RECOGNISE their inherent right to regulate and resolve to preserve the 
flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public welfare, and 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, the 
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Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns. 2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not 
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as 
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an 
investment of an investor. If a Party considers that another Party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult 
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.”) (emphasis added). 
160  Kathleen Cooper et al., Seeking a Regulatory Chill in Canada: The Dow Agrosciences NAFTA Chapter 11 
Challenge to the Quebec Pesticides Management Code, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVT’L. L. J. 5, 29 (2013). 
161  See id. 
162  TPP, supra note 156, at art. 9.16 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.”) (emphasis added). 
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Cases suggest that tribunals inquire into the legitimacy of a regulation to 
determine if it is in the public interest domain. The tribunal might look to 
statements by the government to an investor or its own subjective determinations 
on what an investor should expect in terms of regulation.163 However, in NAFTA, 
this legitimacy determination weighs in favor of investor interest because “tribunal 
members are required to interpret the rights granted to investors within Chapter 
11 in the context of NAFTA’s objectives, which are purely commercial, set forth 
in Article 102.”164 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires giving 
greater weight to the purpose and objective of the treaty.165  
The TPP language includes greater specificity than NAFTA with regard to 
what is legitimate in its expropriation provision.166 If deemed an expropriation, the 
state is required to compensate the investor, similar to takings law.167 Article 9.8(1) 
of the TPP authorizes expropriation where there is a “public purpose,” with the 
caveat that the taking be compensated.168 Takings and expropriation generally 
require compensation if for a public purpose. But the focus here is on regulation 
and indirect expropriation, where some, but not all of the investment expectation 
may have decreased. The TPP incorporates language from the U.S. Model BIT 
that states that indirect expropriation (that is, regulation) is not a taking when 
“applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety and the environment . . . except in rare circumstances.”169 While this 
improved upon NAFTA by theoretically limiting the instances where regulation 
                                                 
163  Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 31.  
164  Id. at 24; NAFTA, supra note 155, at art. 102 (“The objectives of this Agreement . . . are to: a) 
eliminate barriers to trade in, facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services between 
territories of the Parties; b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; c) increase 
substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; d) provide adequate and 
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party’s territory; e) 
create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint 
administration and the resolution of disputes; and f) establish a framework for further trilateral, 
regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.”). 
165  Vienna Convention, supra note 125; Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 28. NAFTA includes adherence 
to international law, presumably Vienna Convention interpretation, among its objectives. NAFTA, 
supra note 155 at art. 102 (“The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement 
in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of 
international law.”). 
166  See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10686.  
167  See id. 
168  TPP, supra note 156, at art. 9.8(1) (“No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered investment 
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation 
(expropriation, except: (a) for a public purpose [footnote omitted]; (b) in a non-discriminatory 
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; and (d) in accordance with due process of law.”). 
169  Id. at Annex 9-B(3)(b).  
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could be deemed a taking, without providing more guidance as to what is 
“legitimate” and what is “rare,” tribunals would have no more guidance than they 
did under NAFTA.170 In fact, Australia refused to sign onto the investment 
provision of the Agreement, even in light of the seemingly more state-favoring 
language. Australia did not want to restrict its ability to regulate in environmental 
and social areas.171 
The ambiguous nature of “legitimate expectations” leads to a tendency for 
states to settle in fear of tribunals interpreting in investors’ favor. NAFTA 
decisions demonstrate that tribunals have largely interpreted these provisions in 
ways favorable to investors. NAFTA’s text does not require dispositive scientific 
evidence of instances of environmental harm or a clear guiding international 
standard, but tribunals have required such evidence as a justification for economic 
harm stemming from public interest regulation.172 
In Dow AgroSciences v. Government of Canada,173 the Canadian government 
defended its decisions to ban pesticides by invoking the precautionary principle. 
Within this framework, a country may ban chemicals unless there is scientific 
evidence that the chemicals are not harmful—a more cautious approach to the 
unknown harms that could result from industrial developments.174 Dow rejected 
this defense, calling it “political” in nature. While the case was settled, scholars 
predict that the tribunal would have focused on Dow’s “legitimate expectations” 
                                                 
170  The TPP did provide some description for what constitutes legitimate public health regulation, by 
ensuring that certain activities would never be considered takings. See TPP, supra note 156, at Annex 
9-B & n. 37 (“For greater certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, regulatory 
actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with respect to the regulation, 
pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, pharmaceuticals (including biological products), 
diagnostics, vaccines, medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and 
appliances and blood and blood-related products.”) 
171  Titi, supra note 1, at 46–47.  
172  Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 43–44. 
173  See Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To Submit a 
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Trade Agreement (Aug. 25, 
2008), https://perma.cc/E8KS-8DPT; Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 31.  
174 John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
13, 13 (2002). As Applegate indicates, 
At its core, the precautionary principle embodies two fundamental regulatory 
policies: anthropogenic harm to human health and the environment should be 
avoided or minimized through anticipatory, preventive regulatory controls; and, 
to accomplish this, activities and technologies whose environmental 
consequences are uncertain but potentially serious should be restricted until the 
uncertainty is largely resolved. It reflects the implicit judgment that, in the 
absence of some degree of ex ante regulatory review, new technologies will 
create novel, severe, and irreversible-but avoidable-harms to human health and 
the environment. Id. 
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with reference to “scientific studies and international guidelines, not measures 
based on the precautionary principle.”175  
In Ethyl Corp v. Government of Canada, the Canadian government settled 
another ISDS claim related to a separate chemical ban, where there was a lack of 
positive evidence regarding the chemical’s harms.176 Conversely, in Chemtura v. 
Canada, the tribunal deferred to Canada’s environmental regulation, rejecting a 
claim that the regulation violated NAFTA’s investment protection provisions 
because there was positive evidence of scientific harm.177 The tribunal determined 
that the government’s assessment was in accordance with international standards 
and commitments, and that the chemical production at issue exceeded acceptable 
health risk based on these standards.178 A precautionary principle approach would 
not have required such extensive evidence. Countries have divergent views about 
whether to apply a precautionary or reactionary approach to their developments.179 
The E.U., for example, includes reference to the principle in its general governing 
treaty.180 However, in investment tribunals, because the text is ambiguous, 
tribunals made normative judgments about the how to define “legitimate.” 
Without clear textual guidance, in Methanex v. U.S., the tribunal rejected the 
expropriation claim. It stated that when states enact environmental regulation in 
good faith, investors should expect environmental regulation to change.181 This 
suggests that arbitrators can be more lenient, even without guidance. On the one 
hand, the state wins and the regulation is enacted; on the other hand, the lack of 
textual guidance makes it difficult for parties to plan for the future, and may stifle 
regulation when states are unsure if the regulation is “legitimate.” NAFTA and 
later BITs allow for some public participation, like amici curiae statements, when 
                                                 
175 Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 43.  
176  See Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the Environment Through 
International Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 383, 422 (2015); Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Can., 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, (Jun. 24, 1998), https://perma.cc/78PA-6JN7. 
177  See Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, (Aug. 2, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/96MG-JGA4; FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS), 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7H9Y-EEP2. 
178  Chemtura Corp., supra note 177, at 37–43. 
179  See, for example, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 191(2), Jul. 6, 2016, 37 
I.L.M. 67 (“Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into 
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the 
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter pay.”). 
180  See id. 
181 Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award, (Aug. 3, 2005), 
https://perma.cc/R9MP-UPAF; FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS), 
supra note 177. 
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the public interest is in question.182 But overall, the lack of clarity and seemingly 
desultory decisions by tribunals demonstrate the need for a more coherent line of 
persuasive precedent and guidance. 
VI.  REFORMING TREATY TEXT AND ARBITRAL BODIES  
While there have been some drafting developments that should theoretically 
give arbitrators more guidance as to the intent of the signatories (that the member 
states want greater discretion to enact public interest regulation), the latest U.S. 
Model BIT and the TPP still cabin public interest regulatory space and fail to 
provide sufficient clarity for tribunals to follow. It would likely be difficult to 
capture the necessary textual precision in a treaty, as norms change and countries 
alter regulation accordingly. Even if this were possible, there would need to be 
structural changes to ensure arbitrators actually interpreted the treaty at hand. 
Dissemination of past decisions might fill in the gaps, but as discussed earlier, 
tribunals appear simply to not be following their own former decisions in a 
coherent way. Despite all the issues, one challenge stands out—how are arbitrators 
to decide when a regulation is legitimate? This Section looks at several scholars’ 
observations and suggests that engaging in a good-faith inquiry is well within the 
meaning of the treaties and would provide a sufficient filter to balance the needs 
of investors and states. 
A.  Treaty Language Suggestions  
There are language alternatives that would better reflect concern for public 
interest regulation. The ideal treaty language that many critics favor would include 
absolute exemptions for public interest regulation. This would require removing 
the “otherwise consistent with this Charter” language that is present in Model 
BITs, NAFTA, and the TPP.183 The following example will show that even with 
very pro-state language, the tribunal will still need to engage in a good-faith inquiry 
to ensure the regulation is legitimate.  
Many critics have suggested Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) as the paradigm for a public interest exception.184 GATT is a 
multilateral treaty with rules governing international trade.185 As such, it creates a 
range of rights and obligations.186 GATT provides ten exemptions, which provide 
                                                 
182  Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 26. 
183  See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10693.  
184 See, for example, KULICK, supra note 134. 
185  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, World Trade Organization, July 1986, 13.1 
U.S.T.I.A. 184 [hereinafter GATT].  
186  See KULICK, supra note 134, at 67.  
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a higher level of guidance than most BITs. There are exemptions for public 
morals; human, animal, or plant life or health; products of prison labor; protection 
of national treasures or historic, artistic or archaeological value: conservation of 
exhaustible resources; or regulations needed for the acquisition of distribution of 
products in general or local short supply.187 Unlike the agreements discussed 
above, it does not qualify the exemptions with “otherwise consistent” language. 
To balance these public interest objectives with investor interests, GATT simply 
prohibits “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”188 
Without the qualifying language, the tribunal is forced to engage in something like 
a good-faith inquiry. But despite being offered as a paradigm, it is not without 
criticism. The exemptions are “an extremely tough hurdle [for states] to clear,”189 
exacerbated by the fact that the burden is on the states to prove good faith.190 
Norway’s legislature attempted a Draft Model BIT of its own with comparable 
robust public interest protection language. It laid out a list of exemptions in the 
preamble and provided commentary on its intentions including a desire for state 
autonomy with regard to regulation.191 However, the draft was never ratified 
because of polarizing criticism from the public, some suggesting there was 
insufficient investor protection and others suggesting that there was insufficient 
room to regulate.192 Norway’s failure suggests that states are not receptive to such 
dramatic changes in language.193 
B.  Interpretive Solution 
This Comment suggests that regardless of whether more precise language is 
adopted, the inquiry will inevitably be the following: is the regulation legitimate? 
Scholars have proposed several methodologies (discussed below) for answering 
this general question, including engaging in comparative law analysis and 
employing threshold inquiries into legitimate regulation. This Comment thus 
proposes building on these methods, and employing a good-faith inquiry will 
determine which regulations are legitimate and which are not. 
                                                 
187  GATT, supra note 185.  
188  Id.  
189  See Cosbey, supra note 93, at 15–16. 
190  Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections—Is a General 
Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 332, 359 (2013).  
191  KULICK, supra note 134, at 73–74.  
192  Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jun. 
8, 2009) https://perma.cc/9ESW-T5CH. 
193  See KULICK, supra note 134, at 75–76.  
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1. Tribunals should consider relevant procedures for dispute 
resolution across various countries. 
Stephan Schill suggests that mapping a public law framework onto 
international investment arbitration will strengthen the legitimacy of the system.194 
He argues that engaging in comparative public law studies will provide guidance 
for tribunals as they develop overarching principles for international investment 
arbitration.195 He finds studies in comparative law particularly suitable because 
arbitration closely parallels constitutional and administrative legal decision-making 
at the domestic level.196 These systems also deal with vague standards, and as such, 
should provide useful models for the vague standards in investment treaties.197 
The problem with Schill’s approach with regard to regulation is the varying 
receptivity states have to regulation. When states have diverging regulations in 
food labelling, for example, there is no correct answer as to what the right amount 
of labelling is. States’ requirements vary based on people’s preferences for 
information about genetically modified foods, hormones, and other attributes. 
Thus, while domestic contexts may provide procedural guidance for how to deal 
with competing investor rights and public interest regulation, they do not offer 
substantive guidance for how to weigh claims in a uniform manner. 
2. Tribunals should have limited discretion to balance public interests 
and investor interests. 
Andreas Kulick proposes applying a proportionality analysis that would 
balance the rights of investors and the public interest.198 In his formula, more 
regulation would qualify as “legitimate.” Arbitrator scrutiny should concern itself 
most with three prongs: “(1) suitability; (2) necessity; and (3) proportionality stricto 
sensu.” Under the first prong, the state only need prove that the regulation 
“furthered the (legitimate) purpose as set by the government.”199 Second, the 
necessity prong looks to whether there are alternative, less restrictive ways to 
achieve said objective.200 This is stricter than the first prong because it can be 
analyzed ex post and find liability when a government was wrong about the course 
of action that it took. Third, proportionality stricto sensu evaluates how important 
                                                 
194  See generally Schill, supra note 2. 
195  Id. at 61. 
196  Id. at 86. 
197 See id. at 89.  
198  KULICK, supra note 134, at 170. Kulick justifies the application of the proportionality balancing 
from the fact that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that general principles of 
international law should be accounted for in BIT interpretation. 
199  Id.  
200  Id.  
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the interest actually is and evaluates the means and ends. This type of analysis 
raises serious questions about the level of scrutiny that should be applied by the 
arbitral tribunals. Considerations might include “the gravity of the infringement” 
by the state; legitimate expectations; “importance of the global public interest”; 
whether or not the public interest assertion is a guise; and “importance of the 
investor right.”201 Under a balancing approach, the compensation should not be 
viewed as all or nothing; rather, compensation to the investor should be adjusted 
based on these factors.202 The first two prongs are useful threshold inquiries that 
a tribunal could engage in before considering the regulation further. 
The third prong asks several questions that would be helpful in a good-faith 
inquiry. Legitimate expectations (like explicit government statements that 
regulation will stay a certain way) and whether the public interest is a guise would 
both expose bad-faith regulations. However, the inquiries in the third prong that 
require weighing the investor’s interest against the public interest are troublesome. 
It will inevitably lead to normative judgments by the tribunal. Further, reducing 
awards by the importance of the public interest might decrease legitimacy of the 
investment arbitration system. Surely, being able to attach seemingly arbitrary 
award numbers to global public interests would only exacerbate a system already 
under scrutiny for being occult and incoherent. Thus, limiting the tribunal’s power 
to balance the public interest and investor expectations should be a goal. 
3. There should be some limit on the state’s ability to regulate. 
Kulick recognized that there needs to be some limit on what a state can 
regulate. This Comment proposes interpretive guidance and a reliance on 
customary international norms as a means to determine whether regulation was 
made in good faith, but will proceed by first establishing that it is possible to read 
in a good-faith inquiry. The U.S. Model BIT (2012) includes an explicit good-faith 
provision where authorities in both the state of the investor and the state in 
violation would review the amount of “good faith” prior to formal arbitration, in 
an attempt to limit investor claims.203 While this phrase is left out of other public 
interest regulation exceptions, it would not be farfetched for it to be read in. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests that a treaty should be 
interpreted in “good faith” (not to be confused with the good-faith inquiry that 
the Comment proposes). It is reasonable to assume that the member states did 
                                                 
201  Id. 
202  Id. at 186–203. 
203  Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10693–94. 
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not intend to have their regulatory powers severely infringed by BITs.204 And thus 
an originalist interpretation may be useful, whereby greater weight is given to what 
parties intended, as opposed to a strict textual interpretation of the treaties. The 
extensive language on public interest regulation in the preambles of recent 
agreements is also a good indicator of the intentions of the member states. The 
“otherwise consistent with this treaty” language has been said to limit the 
regulatory power of states.205 But given the broad language in the preambles of 
the U.S. Model BIT (2012) and the TPP reflecting the desire to promote public 
interest issues, it is reasonable to interpret protection of the environment, public 
health, etc. as consistent with the treaty. When interpreted in this way, it is not 
entirely clear what purpose the phrase serves, but it does not provide sufficient 
justification to read in a strong investor bias. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
Tribunals cannot be compelled to interpret in a certain way, outside the text 
of the treaties. But there are reasons tribunals might be persuaded to interpret 
provisions in a way more favorable to states if interpretive guidance were provided 
by independent bodies. Given the amount of criticism that ISDS has received, if 
the system itself has an interest in survival, arbitration bodies should be more 
receptive to criticism of arbitrary decision-making. Additionally, arbitrators are 
repeat players that have an interest in continuing to arbitrate. They have an interest 
in interpreting treaties in a way that conforms to the public’s interpretation of 
public interest values. While there are numerous theories on why tribunal 
decisions vary, increased interpretative guidance should provide a framework for 
arbitrators to base their decisions on the intent of the member states, not the 
subjective opinions of the arbitrators.   
There should additionally be a presumption of legitimate regulation where 
the regulation mirrors that of international norms. Given the ambiguity in treaties, 
perhaps it makes sense to give the benefit of the doubt to the state, who actually 
signed the treaty. This might include putting the burden of proof for proving the 
regulation was made in bad faith on the investor. For instance, while the ICSID 
tribunal rejected the precautionary principle in Chemtura and required positive 
evidence of environmental harm,206 international custom might have led the 
tribunal to require more evidence from Chemtura that their chemicals were not 
harmful before rejecting the legitimacy of the regulation. The precautionary 
                                                 
204  See KULICK, supra note 134, at 170 (citing B. Kingsbury & S. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as 
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 23 (2009)). 
205  Supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
206  Supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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principle has been an emerging custom in international law since the Rio 
Declaration on the Environment and Development in 1992.207 If there is reason 
to think that a certain practice may cause harm to health, safety, or the 
environment, when the state invokes regulation, the investor would have the 
burden of proof in showing there is no danger. Despite the reference to domestic 
laws in various BITs, including the U.S. Model BIT, it would be more than 
reasonable for countries to exert their right to regulate when it is in line with 
international law norms. Protections are already in place to avoid discriminatory 
and arbitrary action. Thus, the investor’s burden would be a tougher hurdle when 
the state’s regulation, or precaution, was not in line with international norms. 
Further, it has been suggested that the precautionary principle would provide 
guidance stabilizing tribunal decisions.208 
It is possible that giving greater deference to the state will lead to less foreign 
investment in the short term.209 However, as it stands, the current investment 
arbitration system creates an inherent contradiction in international law––creating 
treaties that aim to reduce greenhouse gases for example, yet simultaneously 
burdening countries that try to make progress. Linking legitimate regulation to 
international norms should provide the needed stability for both states and 
investors that the system currently lacks. Regulation that dramatically shifted 
overnight would seem less legitimate than a more gradual approach that mirrored 
regulations in other countries. While it is likely that disputes over what 
international norms are would arise, it would provide a much stronger baseline 
than the current framework. 
                                                 
207  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, art. 15, Jun. 24, 1992, UN Doc A/CONF48/ 
14, 11 ILM 1416 [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (“In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”). 
208  See Caroline E. Foster, Adjudication, Arbitration and the Turn of Public Law ‘Standards of Review’: Putting 
the Precautionary Principle in the Crucible, 3 J INT. DISP. SETTLEMENT 525 (2012). 
209  Although even this critique is debatable. A country may be deterred from drastic regulatory change 
because of the reputational impact such change would have on its ability to attract foreign 
investment, and the most volatile changes would likely receive domestic relief. Finally, insurance 
against political change can be purchased by investors ex ante. Been, supra note 96, at 37–38. 
